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FOOD GOALS FOR 1943 THE AGRICULTURAL • SITUATION •

JANUARY 1943 3861

A Brief Summary of Economic Conditions

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KEYNOTING 1943 food production goals, Secretary Wickard said: "I want to express my admiration of the wonderful production record which farmers made. * * * In the face of growing difficulties they smashed all previous records for total farm production, and they smashed them by a wide margin. * * * But today 1942 is behind us. We are looking ahead to 1943. * * * We must feed our growing Army and Navy. They, with our allies, are going on the offensive now, and that calls for extra food and larger reserves. * * * The needs keep growing. * * * In the pinch of war we can't turn out enough of everything. Asking agriculture to go ahead and increase all production would be like asking industry to increase production of everything it wanted to make. We know what that would mean. * * * Last year we went a long way in converting agriculture to a war basis. This year we are completing that conversion. Every acre of land, every hour of labor, every ton of fertilizer and every piece of equipment must be used to turn out the products we must have. Agriculture is mobilizing 100 percent for war next year. We are in it not up to our knees or our waists, but up to our chins."

Summary of the Goals

MEAT Goals call for production of 25.7 billion pounds of beef, veal, pork, lamb and mutton in 1943; about 4 billion more than in 1942, and 50 percent above the 1936-40 average. Growing lend-lease and military needs will absorb the increased production and about one-fourth of the total output. Supplies for civilians will be much less than they would like to buy at ceiling prices. An order issued in December restricts distribution of commercial meat supplies (excluding farm and local retail slaughter) for civilian use in the first quarter of 1943 to 70 percent of the beef, veal and pork and 75 percent of the lamb and mutton distributed in the first quarter of 1941.

Hog goals are a 15-percent increase over 1942 in the combined spring and fall pig crops, with a 10-pound increase in average weight of hogs marketed. The 1943 pig crop should total about 120 million head, compared with 104.7 million raised in 1942. Requested slaughter of 100 million hogs in calendar year 1943 would result in production of 13.8 billion pounds of pork. Breeding intentions reported in December point to a 24-percent increase in the number of sows to farrow in the 1943 spring season. Assuming a normal number of pigs saved per litter this indicates a spring crop of about 75 million pigs—5 million more than the minimum goal. Hog prices will be supported through September 1944 at not less than 90 percent of parity and not less than \$13.25 per hundredweight average at Chicago for good to choice butcher hogs weighing 240 to 270 pounds. The average price received by farmers for hogs December 15 was 118 percent of parity.

Goals of 9,780 million pounds of **beef** and 1,130 million pounds of **veal**, totaling 9 percent more than the record 1942 output, will require slaughter of 30.4

million head of cattle and calves in 1943, compared with slightly less than 28 million in 1942.

Carcass beef and primary wholesale cuts at the slaughterhouse and wholesale levels were put under specific dollars-and-cents ceiling prices in December. Regional differentials were set, based on transportation costs between surplus and deficit areas. The new ceilings are designed to reflect market prices for live cattle slightly higher than prevailed in September 1942.

Lamb and mutton goals are an output of 990 million pounds, requiring slaughter of 24.1 million head of sheep and lambs. Slaughter of sheep and lambs has been unusually large during the past year, and sheep numbers January 1, 1943, probably were somewhat fewer than a year earlier.

FATS AND OILS Requirements for fats and oils in 1943 under the manufacturers' limitation are estimated at 12 billion pounds, including 9.2 billion for civilians and 2.8 billion for military use and export.

Increased lard output will help meet these record needs. **Lard** output may total more than 3 billion pounds in 1943 compared with 2.5 billion in 1942.

The **soybean** goal of 10.5 million acres harvested for beans will produce 189 million bushels of beans at normal yields of 18 bushels per harvested acre. After taking out seed and feed, 163 million bushels may be left for crushing to produce around 1,440 million pounds of oil. The goal acreage is slightly below that harvested in 1942, because of limited crushing facilities in the principal producing areas, difficulties in transportation and storage of the beans and oil, and the need for increased corn acreage. Some further increase in soybean acreage is sought in the Southern States, wherever yields are satisfactory, inasmuch as adequate

crushing facilities are available in the South. The Department of Agriculture will support prices of soybeans for oil at 90 percent of the price comparable to parity and at not less than \$1.60 to \$1.75 per bushel, U. S. average farm price, for Yellow and Green beans of high oil content.

Goal for **peanuts** is 5.5 million acres, 49 percent above the 3,690,000 acres picked and threshed in 1942. With normal yields of 675 pounds per harvested acre, production would total about 3,712 million pounds. At least 1,450 million will be needed for edible trade, seed and local uses, leaving perhaps 2,200 million pounds for crushing. Some substitution of peanuts for other crops, especially short-staple cotton, will be necessary. Much of the increase will need to come from newer areas, especially Oklahoma and Texas. A single price program has been recommended, which would require new legislation. It would assure growers an average return of 80 to 85 percent of parity for peanuts, whether for edible use or oil. As of December 15, parity for peanuts was \$148.80 per ton. If a single-price program is impossible, support programs similar to those of 1942 will be continued.

Flaxseed goal is 5 million acres, 7 percent more than the 4,691,000 acres planted in 1942. With normal yields of $7\frac{1}{4}$ bushels an acre, 1943 production would be about 36,250,000 bushels. In addition, probably 7 million bushels can be imported from Canada and 5 or 6 million could be withdrawn from stocks built up by the record crop of 40,660,000 bushels in 1942. Under WPB allocations, maximum requirements for linseed oil in 1943 will be about 800 million pounds, the product of about 42 million bushels of flaxseed. Prices of flaxseed for oil will be supported through June 30, 1944, at not less than 90 percent of parity, and at least \$2.70 per bushel, basis No. 1 flaxseed at Minneapolis.

MILK Goal for milk production in 1943 is 122 billion pounds,

which is 2 percent higher than actual production in 1942. Total demand for dairy products may equal 140 billion pounds of milk, but the goal is about as much as farmers can hope to reach. Scarcity of labor in some areas has led to sale of cows for slaughter at a rate somewhat above other recent years. However, the number slaughtered—in relation to the number on farms—is less than in 1934-36, and new programs to keep essential workers on farms should check this trend. Based on reported slaughter and reported number of 2-year old heifers, the number of cows on farms is believed to be 2 percent greater than a year ago. In many areas, average production per cow could be increased through better feeding, with but little extra labor. The Department of Agriculture will support prices of dairy products through June 30, 1944 at not less than 90 percent of the parity equivalent or at least 46 cents a pound for 92-score butter, Chicago basis; 27 cents a pound including subsidy for American cheese, Plymouth basis; 12.5 cents for roller and 14.5 cents for spray process dry skim milk, extra grade Midwest basis; and a comparable price for evaporated milk, f. o. b. plant basis, to be announced.

EGGS AND POULTRY

Rapid increase in protein food production is the objective of the egg goal, 4,780 million dozen, which is 8 percent above egg production in 1942. The goal for chickens for meat is 4 billion pounds, which is 28 percent above 1942. A 9-percent increase in number of laying hens will require greater care of laying flocks to maintain a high rate of lay and unusual attention to egg collection and marketing. Heavier military and lend-lease demands for dried eggs, will leave fewer eggs for consumers than they would like to buy. Goals for dressed chicken can be attained through a 10-percent increase in the number of chickens raised for farm flock replacement, production of 100 to 125 million

young chickens for meat in general farming areas out of the usual season, an increase of 75 million birds in commercial broiler production to be sold at weights averaging not less than 3 pounds. Production of heavier birds by enterprises formerly producing broilers would increase total output materially.

The goal for turkeys is 560 million pounds, compared to 485 million in 1942. Farmers will need to take good care of turkey hens for egg production if the necessary poults are to be obtained.

The Department of Agriculture will support, through June 30, 1944, prices of eggs, chickens (except broilers and chickens weighing less than 3 pounds liveweight) and turkeys, at not less than 90 percent of parity. Egg prices will be supported at the equivalent of at least 30 cents a dozen in spring and early summer and an annual average price of 34 cents a dozen, U. S. average farm price, with differentials for season and location.

FEED GRAINS AND HAY To meet expanding needs for livestock in 1943 and beyond, farmers will need to follow up record 1942 production of feed grain, oil meal and cake, and hay with further increases in feed crop acreage. Since corn is the principal feed grain, farmers in the commercial area are permitted to overplant their corn allotments without penalty, if they have planted their goals of war crops. In order to further stimulate production of corn in the non-commercial corn areas, 1943 loans will be available at the full rate in all parts of the country wherever storage is feasible. To encourage barley production, the Department of Agriculture will support the price of barley from the 1943 crop at a level equal to its feeding value in relation to corn. The 1943 goal calls for nearly a quarter million acres more grain sorghums.

The need for increased acreage of corn and a large acreage of vital oil

crops are primary factors behind the suggested decrease in acreage of oats. The goal for oats is still high enough to permit necessary seedings as nurse crops, with grasses and legumes. The goal for all hay is 1.6 million acres less than the area harvested in 1942, in view of the substantial carryover of tame hay. Insofar as its resources will permit, the Department of Agriculture will endeavor to maintain feed prices in 1943—especially for corn, feed wheat, and oil meal, at about the same levels as in 1942. Loans will be made on grain sorghums at rates slightly higher than in 1942. Maintenance of livestock-feed price ratios favorable to continued heavy feeding are of course essential to reach the food goals.

WHEAT Suggested acreage of wheat planted for harvest in 1943 is 52.5 million acres. At normal yields of 12.4 bushels an acre, this would produce 651 million bushels. Carryover from the 1942 crop will be about 800 million bushels. The resulting supply would meet all expected needs including an adequate carryover, plus an additional 250 million bushels for feed, industrial uses, or shipment to our allies. Wheat allotments total 55 million acres, the least permitted by law. The 1943 goal is virtually the same as the acreage planted for harvesting in 1942, which was 52,533,000 acres. Seedings of winter wheat in the fall of 1942 were down 2 percent from 1941.

RYE Goal of 3,600,000 acres for harvest in 1943 is 6 percent below acreage harvested in 1942. At normal yields, this would produce 40 million bushels as compared with 57.3 million produced in 1942. Estimated 50 million bushel carryover next July 1 will provide ample supplies. If 35 million bushels are fed, total use would be about 54 million bushels, leaving nearly 50 million carryover July 1, 1944. Seedings in the fall of 1942 including rye for pasture and cover crop as well

as grain, were 8 percent less than in 1941.

DRY BEANS Goal for 1943 production of dry edible beans is 25,542,000 bags (uncleaned basis). Farmers will have to plant 3,300,000 acres to meet the goal, assuming that yields will be normal. Plantings were 2,135,000 acres in 1942 and 2,255,000 in 1941. Production in 1942 was 19,608,000 bags. Comparatively easy to store and transport, dry beans are a good source of protein and energy. Prices of the 1943 crop of dry beans will be supported through June 30, 1944, at not less than 90 percent of parity, calculated at the beginning of the marketing year, for the following varietal types: Pea, Medium White, Great Northern, Small White, Flat Small White, Pink, Pinto, Cranberry, Light Red Kidney, Dark Red Kidney, and Western Red Kidney. Supports will be at least \$5.60 per 100 pounds for U. S. No. 1 beans and \$5.45 per 100 pounds for U. S. No. 2 beans, in bags f. o. b. cars at country shipping points.

DRY PEAS The goal for dry peas is 6,078,000 bags, uncleaned, which would require planting of about 665,000 acres. The 1943 crop of Alaska, Bluebell, Scotch Green, First and Best, and White Canada will be supported through June 30, 1944, at not less than 90 percent of parity or at least \$5.25 per 100 pounds for U. S. No. 1 peas and \$5.00 per 100 pounds for U. S. No. 2 peas, in bags f. o. b. cars at country shipping points.

RICE The goal of 1,380,000 acres of rice is about 125,000 acres less than was planted in 1942. The goal acreage, if yields are normal, would produce around 66.8 million bushels as compared to 66.4 million in 1942. This is fairly close to processing capacity. Loans to eligible producers will be available under the 1938 AA Act, as amended, at 90 percent of parity.

COTTON The cotton goal for 1943 is 22,500,000 acres, about 810,000 fewer acres than were planted for 1942. Producers of short-staple cotton are urged to shift to varieties one inch or longer, or where practicable to other crops urgently needed in the war. Prices of American-Egyptian cotton will be supported through June 30, 1944, at not less than 90 percent of parity, at least 45 cents a pound for No. 2, 1½ inch American-Egyptian cotton. The support price will also be at least as high as it was in 1942, relative to the loan rate in Arizona for 1½₁₆ Middling Upland cotton. Loans will be available to eligible producers of upland cotton at 90 percent of parity.

POTATOES The goal for Irish potatoes is 3,260,000 acres, which is 17 percent larger than acreage planted in 1942. This should produce around 407,700,000 bushels if yields are normal. Price supports will be at least 90 percent of parity.

For sweetpotatoes, the goal is 757,000 acres harvested as compared to 707,000 acres harvested in 1942. With average yields, production should be about 63,361,000 bushels as compared with 65,380,000 in 1942.

FRUITS Suggested production of the 11 major fruits from 1943 bloom is 14,600,000 tons, fresh equivalent basis, which is about equal to production from 1941 bloom and only slightly less than from 1942 bloom. Production of deciduous fruits and grapes probably will approximate the 1936-41 average. The citrus crop may be 20 percent above average. The limited supply of canned fruits and juices will make increased packs of frozen berries desirable in 1943.

Military and lend-lease needs for dried fruits will be substantially greater than in 1942. Civilians will want large quantities to substitute for canned fruits and juices. Maximum production of dried fruits is desirable.

One-fourth of the 1942 pack of canned fruit and fruit juices, estimated at 86 million cases (No. 2½ can basis), probably will be bought for military and lend-lease uses. This will leave less for civilians than they would like to buy at present ceiling prices. Need for dried fruit and the shortage of cans will reduce the 1942 pack of many commodities. If imports of canned pineapple and pineapple juice are maintained and if fruit that cannot be used in other forms is canned, the total pack of all fruit for 1943-44 will be large enough to supply all governmental requirements and make available for civilians about 60 percent as much as they consumed in the average of the last five seasons.

VEGETABLES

Commercial truck crop acreage suggested for fresh market in 1943 is 1,720,000 acres, which is about the same as was harvested in 1942. If yields are normal, tonnage will be about 93 percent of 1942 production and about equal to the 1936-40 average.

Increases are suggested for carrots, kale, lima and snap beans, sweet corn, onions, cabbage, beets and tomatoes; no change for peas, spinach and asparagus; decreases for artichokes, peppers, eggplants, lettuce, watermelons, canteloupes, cauliflower, cucumbers and celery. Suggestions for larger or smaller acreage are based on the nutritive value of each vegetable, its requirements for labor and shipping space, and recent trends in acreage.

Market gardens near points of consumption are important sources of supply during the late summer and fall. Increased production is urgent wherever land, markets and labor are available. Home garden production also will be more important than in recent years.

The total pack of canned vegetables is expected to be nearly as large in 1943 as in 1942, although it may be curtailed somewhat by the need to conserve tin. Civilian consumption

already has been curtailed by orders requiring canners to set aside about 35 percent of the 1942 pack of certain fruits and vegetables for Government purchase. Government requirements will be much greater in 1943, leaving substantially less for civilians. This situation led to plans for immediate rationing of canned, as well as dried and frozen, vegetables and fruits. Prospective growers of vegetables for canning should assure themselves of a market before planting on a large scale.

As this was written, a series of specific price supports was being worked out, to include snap beans, corn, peas, tomatoes, beets, carrots, pumpkin and squash for processing, and cabbage for kraut. In general, support prices will be maintained through certification of canners agreeing to pay specified prices to growers and through Government commitment to buy the processed commodity at amounts that will support grower prices at about 1942 levels.

OTHER CROPS

The sugar beet goal for 1943 is 1,050,000 acres—virtually the same as acreage planted in 1942. Further increases would be difficult in view of the large labor requirements, competition with other essential crops, and limited processing capacity.

Suggested for 1943 are about 300,000 acres of sugarcane for sugar in Louisiana, and 40,000 acres in Florida. On the basis of normal yields, this would utilize nearly all available processing capacity in those States.

To relieve a potential shortage of rope and twine, goals were set at 300,000 acres of hemp for fiber and 50,000 acres for seed. However, it now seems likely that only enough seed for 200,000 acres will be available.

Tobacco goals call for 750,000 pounds of flue-cured, 385,000,000 pounds of burley, and 286,000,000 pounds of other domestic. These represent increases from the 1942 harvested acreages of 6 percent for flue-cured, 20

percent for burley, and 15 percent for other domestic types.

PRODUCTION TOTALS

Goals for all farm commodities in 1943 call for a 4-percent increase above production in 1942, assuming normal crop yields. Goals in 1942 were nearly 6 percent above actual production in 1941; the actual increase was 12 percent. The 1943 livestock goals are 12 percent higher than 1942 production. The 1942 goals were 9 percent above 1941 livestock production and the actual increase was about 12 percent. Crop yields per acre were at an all time high in 1942, around 12 percent greater than in 1941, and crop production was 14 percent greater. If yields had been normal, crop production called for by 1942 goals would have been about the same as in 1941. If yields are normal this year, crop production will drop back nearly to 1941 levels.

The table on page 9 compares

Index Numbers of Prices Received and Paid by Farmers

[1910-14=100]

Year and month	Prices received	Prices paid interest and taxes	Buying power of farm products ¹
1941			
January.....	104	128	81
February.....	103	128	80
March.....	103	129	80
April.....	110	129	85
May.....	112	130	86
June.....	118	132	89
July.....	125	133	94
August.....	131	136	96
September.....	139	138	101
October.....	139	141	99
November.....	135	143	94
December.....	143	143	100
1942			
January.....	149	146	102
February.....	145	147	99
March.....	146	150	97
April.....	150	151	99
May.....	152	152	100
June.....	151	152	99
July.....	154	152	101
August.....	163	152	107
September.....	163	153	107
October.....	169	154	110
November.....	169	155	109
December.....	178	155	115

¹ Ratio of prices received to prices paid, interest and taxes.

Prices of Farm Products

[Estimates of average prices received by farmers at local farm markets based on reports to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Average of reports covering the United States weighted according to relative importance of district and State]

	5-year average, August 1909-July 1914	December average, 1909-13	December 1941	November 1942	December 1942	Parity price, December 1942
Wheat (bushel).....cents..	88.4	86.7	102.2	104.4	110.3	137.0
Corn (bushel).....do.....	64.2	57.7	66.9	75.9	80.2	99.5
Oats (bushel).....do.....	39.9	38.3	45.2	44.3	47.4	61.8
Rice (bushel).....do.....	81.3		¹ 147.0	146.9	162.4	126.0
Cotton (pound).....do.....	12.4	12.2	16.23	19.22	19.55	19.22
Potatoes (bushel).....do.....	69.7	62.3	82.7	108.4	111.8	111.5
Hay (ton).....dollars..	11.87	11.99	9.43	9.84	10.46	18.40
Soybeans (bushel).....do.....			1.47	1.58	1.59	1.49
Peanuts (pound).....cents..	4.80	4.6	4.79	5.94	6.19	7.44
Peanuts for oil (pound).....do.....			4.21	4.04	3.97	3.64
Apples (bushel).....dollars..	.96	.91	1.09	1.24	1.43	1.49
Hogs (hundredweight).....do.....	7.27	6.83	10.32	13.44	13.27	11.27
Beef cattle (hundredweight).....do.....	5.42	5.19	9.34	11.39	11.43	8.40
Veal calves (hundredweight).....do.....	6.75	6.71	11.18	13.02	13.14	10.46
Lambs (hundredweight).....do.....	5.88	5.50	10.13	12.05	12.51	9.11
Butterfat (pound).....cents..	26.3	29.9	36.0	47.8	48.9	40.8
Milk, wholesale (100 pound).....dollars..	1.60	1.88	2.66	¹ 2.97	3.01	2.48
Chickens (pound).....cents..	11.4	10.6	15.8	19.6	20.5	17.7
Eggs (dozen).....do.....	21.5	29.9	34.1	38.9	39.7	33.3
Wool (pound).....do.....	18.3	18.6	37.1	39.7	39.7	28.4
Tobacco:						
Flue-cured-types 11-14 (pound).....cents..	² 22.9		17.8	40.0		28.6
Fire-cured-types 21-24 (pound).....do.....	² 13.6		¹ 14.6			13.3
Maryland-type 32 (pound).....do.....	² 22.9		¹ 24.41	28.5		22.4

¹ Revised.

² Base price crop years 1919-28.

³ Adjusted for seasonality.


⁴ Base price crop years 1934-33.

1943 goals with 1942 goals and year-end revised estimates of 1942 performance. Production estimates in the goals are based on the assumption of "normal" crop yields—in most cases the 1937–41 average. Acreages shown in the table are planted acreages, unless otherwise indicated. Percentage changes from 1942 suggested in 1943 are in many instances different from those originally announced. This reflects a revision in 1942 estimates and not in 1943 goals, except for

potatoes and dry beans. The percentage changes, of course, represent national averages. Much larger changes will be necessary in some areas; in others, there will be less possibility of shifting production.

Inasmuch as the goal for pigs is a 15 percent increase, revisions in 1942 estimates made it necessary to change the numbers goals for 1943. For a similar reason, the acreage goal for truck crops is slightly different from that announced originally.

**ESTIMATED MEAT CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (RETAIL WEIGHT)
BY FAMILY INCOME LEVEL, 1942**



Production Goals for 1943, With Comparisons

Commodity	Units	1942 goal or expected	1942 reported ¹	1943 goal or expected	1943 percent of 1942 reported ²
		<i>Thousands</i>	<i>Thousands</i>	<i>Thousands</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Wheat.....	{ Acres ---	55,000	52,533	52,500	100
	{ Bushels ---	793,000	981,327	651,000	66
Rye.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	3,550	3,837	3,600	94
	{ Bushels ---	48,000	57,341	40,000	70
Rice.....	{ Acres ---	1,320	1,505	1,380	92
	{ Bushels ---	65,000	66,363	66,800	101
Corn.....	{ Acres ---	93,750	91,011	95,000	104
	{ Bushels ---	2,675,000	3,175,154	2,834,000	89
Oats.....	{ Acres ---	40,000	42,656	37,300	87
	{ Bushels ---	1,200,000	1,358,730	1,137,650	84
Barley.....	{ Acres ---	16,000	19,433	18,000	93
	{ Bushels ---	360,000	426,150	392,000	92
Grain sorghum.....	{ Acres ---	10,000	9,755	10,000	103
	{ Bushels ---	120,000	149,795	127,000	85
Hay, all.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	72,000	72,744	71,100	98
	{ Tons ---	94,000	105,328	94,500	90
Flaxseed.....	{ Acres ---	4,500	4,691	5,000	107
	{ Bushels ---	36,000	40,660	36,250	89
Soybeans for beans.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	9,000	10,762	10,500	98
	{ Bushels ---	153,000	209,559	189,000	90
Peanuts picked and threshed.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	5,000	3,690	5,500	149
	{ Pounds ---	3,750,000	2,504,440	3,712,500	148
Dry beans.....	{ Acres ---	2,600	2,135	3,300	155
	{ Bags ³ ---	20,400	19,608	25,542	130
Dry peas.....	{ Acres ---	665	501	665	133
	{ Bags ³ ---	6,450	7,160	6,078	85
Cotton.....	{ Acres ---	25,000	23,310	22,500	97
Tobacco:	{ Bales ⁴ ---	12,000	12,982	11,300	87
Flue-cured.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	841	792	841	106
	{ Pounds ---	750,000	824,115	750,000	91
Burley.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	353	351	421	120
	{ Pounds ---	350,000	331,005	385,000	116
Other domestic.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	272	237	272	115
	{ Pounds ---	286,000	262,068	286,000	109
Sugarcane for sugar and seed (sugar).....	{ Acres ¹ ---	330	329	340	103
	{ Tons ---	525	537	525	98
Sugarbeets (sugar).....	{ Acres ---	1,050	1,049	1,050	100
	{ Tons ---	1,900	1,664	1,900	114
Potatoes.....	{ Acres ---	3,060	2,793	3,160	117
	{ Bushels ---	384,000	371,150	390,600	110
Sweet potatoes.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	850	707	757	107
	{ Bushels ---	70,000	65,380	63,361	97
Commercial truck crops ¹	{ Acres ¹ ---	1,840	1,692	1,676	99
Hay crop seeds.....	{ Acres ¹ ---	4,919	3,392	4,709	139
Hemp for fiber.....	{ Acres ---			300	
Fruit (fresh equivalent).....	{ Tons ---	15,018	14,718	14,610	99
Cattle and calves on farms, Jan. 1.....	{ Number ---		74,600	76,200	102
Cattle and calves slaughtered.....	{ Number ---	28,000	27,900	30,400	109
Dressed weight.....	{ Pounds ---	9,585,000	9,980,000	10,910,000	109
Sheep and lambs on farms Jan. 1.....	{ Number ---		56,000	55,000	98
Sheep and lambs slaughtered.....	{ Number ---	22,900	26,000	24,100	93
Dressed weight.....	{ Pounds ---	940,000	1,060,000	990,000	93
Hogs:					
Spring pigs.....	{ Number ---		61,013	70,200	115
Fall pigs.....	{ Number ---		43,721	50,300	115
Hogs, slaughtered.....	{ Number ---	83,000	80,000	100,000	125
Dressed weight.....	{ Pounds ---	11,125,000	10,940,000	13,800,000	128
Lard.....	{ Pounds ---	2,820,000	2,500,000	3,400,000	136
Milk cows.....	{ Number ---	25,200	25,200	25,720	102
Milk.....	{ Pounds ---	125,000,000	119,500,000	122,000,000	102
Chicken, dressed weight.....	{ Pounds ---	3,118,000	3,118,000	4,000,000	128
Eggs, total production.....	{ Dozen ---	4,200,000	4,414,000	4,780,000	108
Turkeys, dressed weight.....	{ Pounds ---	500,000	485,000	560,000	115

¹ Harvested. ² For fresh market.

³ 100-pound bags, uncleaned.

⁴ 500-pound bales.

⁵ Revised through January 18.

Farm Mobilization Campaign

LIKE any soldier on the fighting fronts, the American farmer in 1943 must pit his full strength against the Axis aggressors to help win the greatest war in history. He must try to produce more Food for Freedom than the Nation has ever seen in a year's harvest. He must do this with a limited labor supply, limited machinery and limited transportation.

He must produce, not willy-nilly, but more of specified war crops; he must cut away accustomed acreage from crops less needed, crops least beneficial to the diet of a world at war. He must furnish harvests to feed not only our fighting men and the 130 millions in this country, but also millions in the United Nations and in areas which our armed forces reoccupy.

To help the farmer do this job a Nation-wide campaign for farm mobilization has been worked out by the Department of Agriculture. All agricultural resources of the Nation are to be mobilized to achieve maximum production of needed crops and livestock. The aim is to enlist the aid of every farm in the Nation to work out the type of production most necessary to winning the war.

THE President, himself, set forth the importance of the farmer's task in his proclamation fixing January 12, 1943, as Farm Mobilization Day. In this proclamation he asked farmers to gather "wherever possible with Department of Agriculture representatives, Extension Service agents, vocational teachers, State officials, farm organizations, and others concerned, in order to discuss ways and means of insuring for the year 1943 the maximum production of vital foods upon every farm in this country."

The President expressed his appreciation for the record harvests achieved in the last 3 years, and emphasized that the country owes farmers a debt of gratitude. As he succinctly put

it, "Food is no less a weapon than tanks, guns, and planes."

The President depicted another important feature which every farmer and every farm administrative worker should hold in mind. Farm Mobilization Day, he said, should be "a symbol of a free America; a symbol of the might and productivity of our Nation, and a symbol of our unalterable determination to put to full use our agricultural resources, as well as our other resources, in the achievement of complete victory."

THE mobilization campaign began with the four regional meetings on production goals the first half of December. At this time the Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wickard, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Grover B. Hill, and a staff of Department officials presented a picture of the National needs and of the goals to be met by each of the four regions. In general, these goals reflect the need for foods of most value in the wartime diet. They call for all the milk we can produce, more meat and eggs, more feed grains to support increased livestock production, more dried beans and peas to help supply the proteins needed in our diet, more poultry to supplement our supply of other meats, more of the vegetables that are essential because of their high food value, more oil crops and more long-staple cotton.

As soon as the meetings were concluded in each of the 4 regions, the USDA State War Boards held meetings to fix the goals for the individual counties, and then held State-wide or district meetings with the County War Boards to help them work out their plans for farm mobilization. This entailed presenting the over-all National picture, the regional and specific State production goals, and the importance in the county of working out the goals with the cooperation of every farmer.

From that point on the details of farm mobilization lay with the County War Boards. Farm Mobilization Day committees participated in community or county meetings at which farmers heard explanations of the county farm production goals and other requirements for carrying out the National organization of agricultural resources.

The County Boards arranged training meetings for the AAA community committeemen. They worked out methods to publicize the most important phases of the farm plan so that the final farm plan "sign-up" could be completed promptly without loss of time, when, on Mobilization Day and after, the AAA committeemen contacted each farmer.

The farm plan data provide the basis for county War Board recommendations, regarding the provision of needed labor, machinery, materials, and transportation. In passing on these plans the county War Boards have followed a practice of immediate handling of urgent cases with daily meetings when necessary. At these sessions an indication is given by each agency represented on the Board as to whether the need of each farmer can be met. Notification is given the farmer of decisions made in their particular cases. The county boards, too, are following up on commitments to make sure that the farm program can be carried out by the individual farmer. In this connection a schedule of the dates when commitments are to be fulfilled is kept by each board.

ONE move to help create maximum local interest is the honoring of farm families by publicizing 1942 production and 1943 plans and wherever feasible by selection of a typical farm family. Since numerous families would be representative, in many instances a committee has been named by the War Board to select the families who have contributed materially to the agricultural war program and, from this group, to choose by lot one family.

In making the selection of the several

families, a few basic points are considered. The family must have met or exceeded all the production goals for the farm for 1942, overcoming difficulties arising from war conditions, and must be signed up for maximum possible war production in the 1943 Farm Mobilization. The family must have taken definite and positive steps to maintain the productivity of the farm through soil-building and conserving practices. It must typify the best in cooperation and community activities such as pooling labor, machinery and transportation. Its record should be one of contributing materially to community accomplishments.

In many counties arrangements have been made for a public recognition ceremony sponsored by a civic or farm organization, including a luncheon or dinner meeting with an appropriate program. Presumably a part of this program will be the introduction of the typical family and an explanation by the family of its work in 1942 and its plan for participation in 1943.

Included in the planning have been the Mobilization Day posters, school assembly programs, press and radio participation and other activities to keep the farmers informed.

Farmers everywhere have been anxious to "join up" in the mobilization, hoping to maintain the remarkable records of the last 3 years. They know that, as the President states, "although they have produced much this year (1942), the Nation will require even more of them during the year that is now before us."

They recall, too, the President's further words: "In full realization of the many difficulties affecting farm production during wartime, the people of this Nation place reliance on the zeal, devotion, and unstinting effort of farmers to do their part toward ultimate victory."

M. CLIFFORD TOWNSEND, *Director of Food Production*

Farm Labor and 1943 Goals

AGRICULTURAL production in 1943 probably will call for at least as many workers as were employed in 1942. If yields are normal the crop production represented by the goals will be only 89 percent of the exceptional crop of 1942. However, some of the recommendations relate to crops with relatively high labor requirements. Such are the 17 percent increase in potato acreage, and the 20 percent increase in acreage of burley tobacco. The suggested acreage for commercial truck crops for fresh market is slightly less than that harvested in 1942.

While livestock production in 1943 is set at 112 percent of 1942, it is likely that if further losses of herders, shearers, range riders, dairy workers, etc. can be avoided, the 1943 goal can be reached without any great expansion in the farm labor force. The number of cattle, calves and sheep will be somewhat reduced next year. However, skilled management will be required, to attain a 15 percent increase of both spring and fall pig crops in 1943 over 1942 levels, and a two percent increase over 1942 in the production of milk. Much of the additional milk can be secured through better feeding and care, without requiring additional labor.

AAVAILABLE estimates of gross losses of farm manpower, already sustained and anticipated, indicate a labor problem in 1943 of considerable magnitude. Between April 1940, and October 1942 nearly 3 million farm workers, actual or potential, of both sexes, were lost through their having left the farms, having gone into non-farm work although retaining farm residence and having entered the armed forces. This estimate includes only rural farm persons; it does not include persons under 14 years of age nor older persons unfitted for farm

work. Between October 1942 and October 1943, the already depleted farm labor reserves may be reduced by another 1.2 million, of whom about 700,000 may enter the armed forces. This estimate assumes an armed force of 10.5 million men by January 1944 and a further net increase in nonagricultural employment. Under the Tydings amendment to the Selective Service Act more persons may be retained on farms than is assumed in this estimate, from among those otherwise eligible for induction into the armed forces, who are "found by a local board to be necessary to and regularly engaged in an agricultural occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort." No broad estimates are as yet available as to the number of farm men who will be deferred from military service by virtue of the new regulations.

IN certain respects the agricultural manpower situation in the spring months of 1943 may be as difficult as that of the summer, even though numbers in the armed forces and in non-agricultural employment will continue to increase throughout the year. For one thing, the services of women and children cannot be utilized as well in the spring as in the summer, since much of the early season farm work is so heavy that it can be adequately performed only by adult male labor. School attendance greatly reduces the availability of younger persons for farm work. Moreover, between April and July there is normally a seasonal migration to farms of workers from nonfarm areas, which helps to meet the greater demand for labor during the summer months.

Difficult as the 1943 farm manpower problem may be, past experience supports the view that it will not prove insuperable. Despite the loss of an estimated 3 million rural farm per-

sons from the farm labor reserves between April 1940, and October 1942, BAE estimates that on October 1, 1942, the number of persons employed on farms was only about 250,000 less than on October 1, 1940. Of course, many of the replacements lacked the skill of the farm workers whose places they took, being mainly women, children, school-age persons and older men. Nevertheless, until last winter, there was little serious concern among farmers over farm labor shortage, and despite widespread uneasiness on that subject during 1942, last year, with the aid of good weather, the farms of America produced about 12 percent more than in 1941 and 27 percent more than the 1935-39 average.

THE experience of American farmers during 1942 is reflected in the results of a recent nation-wide survey carried out by the War Boards of the Department of Agriculture, in the course of which 6,100 farmers in 567 counties were interviewed about the labor situation on their farms and asked to comment on the outlook for 1943. Entry of farm workers into the armed forces made up one-fourth to one-half of total gross losses of farm manpower, except in the West North Central States, where this source of loss exceeded that due to movement of farm workers into nonfarm employment, and in the Mountain States, where these two types of loss were practically equal. Although the majority of persons who shifted to nonfarm employment moved away from the farms, in the different geographic divisions the proportion of such persons varied widely. In the East North Central States nearly 40 percent of the persons accepting nonfarm employment continued their residence on farms. In September 1942 the farm employment total included nearly 500,000 fewer men of the 18 to 44 age group than was the case a year earlier, a decrease of 10 percent. There were nearly 6 percent more men over 45

years of age and 5 percent more adult women employed in agriculture than in September 1941, while the number of boys and girls 14 to 17 years of age was 14 percent greater. Employment of children under 14 years of age was 8 percent larger than a year earlier. These figures are the more significant in that this survey took no account of losses of workers hired for short periods.

The results of the War Board Survey indicate that gross losses of farm workers were heavier on farms of large acreage than on smaller ones, although the very smallest farms also suffered losses that were disproportionately great. Large farms, on the other hand, were apparently able to replace losses more readily than smaller farms.

UNDER the conditions of manpower shortage in prospect for 1943, it is obvious that the utmost possible effectiveness must be achieved (1) in recruiting farm workers from sources hitherto only partly utilized or altogether neglected, (2) in placing workers in areas and on farms where they will do the most good, under the best possible conditions of employment, (3) in providing such management and supervision as will insure the best possible use of all labor available, and (4) in utilizing to the utmost all labor saving machinery. Most of this can be achieved only by effort put forth on the farm and in the rural community; it will require active cooperation between farmers and local organizations. State and national agencies are prepared to assist.

A BASIC step in making use of all our human resources is to find out where unemployed or underemployed manpower is. In certain areas, e. g. in the cut-over districts of northern Great Lakes States, in the Appalachian highlands and the Ozarks, —steps have been taken to discover the number and location of persons not now effectively employed who are able

and willing to move to places where they can contribute more effectively to increased production of food. By arrangement between the Employment Service and the Farm Security Administration in Wisconsin a beginning has been made at moving prospective dairy workers from the cut-over areas to milk-producing counties in the southeastern part of the State. Similar work is being initiated in Missouri and Illinois. In Kentucky, under similar experimental arrangements between U. S. Employment Service and Farm Security Administration, and with the cooperation of the State agricultural colleges in Kentucky and Ohio, a few score prospective year-round dairy workers are being assisted to move to northern Ohio. On the way, at Columbus, Ohio, they receive a three weeks course of training, to facilitate their entry into a type of agriculture rather different from that to which they are accustomed.

A recent survey in the Appalachian highlands reveals that since April 1940, when the last Census was taken, the reservoir of manpower has been greatly depleted. The movement out of the area, into the armed forces and into war jobs, or into jobs from which others have moved into war industries, has been haphazard and without guidance from any public agency, such as the Employment Service. The men and women who have left were drawn from the age groups of greatest vigor and from among those who had the most schooling. They came from the parts that were most accessible. In the more isolated districts, a substantial reservoir of labor of this same sort remains—men and boys of working age from farm families, who can be more productively employed in farm work elsewhere than they are at present. In less remote districts, those whom the recent migration has left behind, are mostly unmarried girls and youths of school age who may be more useful in industry than in agriculture.

A similar survey of twenty-four Spanish-speaking villages in New Mexico indicates an outward movement exceeding that of all recent periods. Inductions into the army and migration to employment in war industries have taken 45 percent of the men from 15 to 65 years of age. Less than 30 percent of the normal number of men between 20-30 years of age remain in the villages.

DURING the past year the U. S. E. S. and the F. S. A. have combined forces to provide seasonal workers for agricultural operations and to return them afterwards to their homes. From the Appalachian area, apple, tomato, and bean pickers have been moved to New York and New Jersey. Tobacco workers have been supplied to Shelby County, Kentucky and Hartford County, Connecticut. Sugar-beet workers have been sent to Michigan, and most recent of all, cotton pickers have been temporarily transferred from the Mississippi Delta and southeastern Missouri to Arizona and New Mexico. Camp and housing facilities have been supplied. These and other instances supply a basis of experience which promises well for 1943 as regards large-scale transferral of seasonal labor.

However, labor cannot be transferred unless it is available. In order to stimulate to the utmost all agencies capable of contributing to the mobilization of workers for food production, the Extension Service, the Employment Service and the Office of Education are considering a program to facilitate the recruiting, training and placement of school youth. Through its neighborhood leaders the Extension Service, in cooperation with the War Boards, will assist communities in making available for the agricultural war production effort every possible worker, man or woman, boy or girl.

SOME light is thrown upon prospects for this season by the nationwide War Board Survey referred to above. While farmers generally had a pessimistic outlook with respect to the farm labor supply this year, not only as regards adult male workers but as regards the number of women and children likely to be employed in 1943, 67 percent indicated that they expected to handle as large a crop and livestock program in 1943 as they did in 1942. In the North Central States 76 percent of the farmers took this point of view, in the Mountain and South Atlantic States only 61 percent. The highest percentages of

those who expressed optimism with respect to 1943 production related to farmers in the smaller size groups and the lowest percentage to the class of farms of the largest size. When asked specifically as to the number of each of the major types of livestock that they intended to handle in 1943 farmers indicated increases in every class. Greater numbers of milk cows, hogs and pigs in 1943 were expected by farmers in each of the geographic divisions except the Pacific. In two divisions minor decreases in beef cattle were anticipated and in two, also, small decreases of sheep and lambs.

WILLIAM T. HAM.

AAA Program and the Goals

NOTHING we can send to Britain, Russia, China, the Fighting French or the enslaved peoples we will liberate in 1943, will yield us a bigger return in production—in fighting spirit—in actual destruction of the enemy—than food.

In 1942, despite severe shortages of labor, machinery, and supplies, American farmers doubled soybean and peanut output over 1941, produced 7 billion more eggs, 20 million more hogs, and 4 billion pounds more milk. Total farm production was 12 percent above any previous year in history.

But in 1943, needs are even greater. This year we used about 13 percent of our total farm output to supply our armed forces and our allies. In 1943, we must put 25 percent or more of our total farm output to such use—and this 25 percent includes at least the following: More than one-fourth of our meat, one-third of our eggs and lard, and more than one-half of our canned vegetable production. The 1943 goals call for a total production even larger than the amazing output of 1942, despite much more serious scarcities of labor, machinery and supplies. Indications are that with normal yields next year, as contrasted with the un-

usually good yields of 1942, crop production may be smaller and livestock production larger.

Such demands strain the American farm plant to the very limit. We have neither an acre nor a minute to spare, for acres and minutes mean human lives. Yes, human liberty!

TRIPLE-A payments in 1943 will be made according to how well each farmer carries out his individual plan representing his share of the 1943 farm war production goals.

Triple-A committeemen again will conduct the goals sign-up campaign. They will be responsible for working out with virtually every farmer in the country complete plans for individual farms covering 1943 crop and livestock production.

IN making out his 1943 production plan, each farmer will specify (a) the crop adjustments he will make, and (b) the production practices he will employ to increase his yields. For making adjustments and for carrying out production practices, farmers can earn payments which serve as incentive to produce full amounts of the needed crops.

We cannot afford to produce a bushel more wheat or a bale more short staple cotton than is actually needed. Triple-A acreage allotments will again serve as guides for planting the right acreage of needed crops. Allotments are applicable for corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and wheat.

In accordance with the law the 1943 wheat allotment has been set again, as in 1942, at the minimum of 55,000,000 acres. And following the formula set up under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the allotment of cotton has been reduced to the minimum of 27,300,000 acres. The national 1943 goals, however, are 52½ million acres for wheat and 22½ million acres for cotton.

The allotments for wheat and cotton, although set as low as the law permits, are still larger than our actual needs. Therefore, farmers are urged to shift part of their wheat and cotton acreage into war crops or designated feed crops and in so doing they will be cooperating fully with the program.

The allotment for edible peanuts is 1,610,000 acres, determined in accordance with legislative requirements. Because of the urgent need for oil, a peanut-for-oil goal calls for 3,890,000 acres, making a total peanut goal of 5,500,000 acres.

SO important is it that the acreage allotments be closely adhered to that deductions for planting cotton, wheat, and tobacco in excess of the allotments are set at *10 times the payment rate*. In other words, if a farmer plants 10 percent above his allotment of these crops, he will lose his entire crop payment.

One other important provision will be used in the 1943 program to emphasize the importance of meeting the war crop goals. If a farmer fails to meet 90 percent of the war crop goals for his farm, deductions will be made from his crop payment at a rate of \$15 per acre.

It is obvious from the above that the 1943 Triple-A program is concen-

trated on farm production of the things we need in accordance with the national, State, county, and individual farm goals. At the same time, it is endeavoring to make production as selective as possible.

THE 1943 program also stresses the importance of conservation practices which increase yield per acre here and now. In view of the tremendous demands on the American farm plant and the scarcities of labor and farm machinery the greatly increased use of single practices such as contour cultivation and others cannot be over-estimated. Now, more than ever before, farmers must realize that yields can be increased by effective production practices.

The Triple-A, in cooperation with the Soil Conservation Service and State technical committees, has named the practices which are especially effective in given areas, and has thus placed great responsibility in the hands of the local Triple-A officers throughout the country.

Marketing quotas, approved by two-thirds of the growers voting in free elections, will again be in effect on cotton, wheat, peanuts, and flue-cured, burley, fire-cured, and dark air-cured tobacco, and will again divide equitably among growers of these commodities the responsibility of adjusting them to our war-time economy. Also, quotas assure each producer of the commodity a fair share of the available market.

A MAJOR contribution of the AAA organization to the war is the local work of its farmer-elected county and community committees. The farming experience and the training developed over the last 9 years, which is represented by these committees, provide a wealth of practical knowledge, information, and understanding of both local and national farm problems.

FRED S. WALLACE, *Chief,*
Agricultural Adjustment Agency.

Vegetable Goals and Problems

VEGETABLE farmers face an increasing number of production and marketing problems brought on by the war. Labor, fertilizer, insecticides, and equipment are becoming scarce. At the same time increased consumer purchasing power and the requirements for Army, Navy, and lend-lease have increased needs. To meet these needs in 1942 the Department of Agriculture sought to expand the production of canned green peas and tomatoes. It supported the prices of most canned vegetables and Irish potatoes to be sure that sufficient supplies were produced. Steps were taken to process as much cabbage kraut as possible from the unexpectedly large crop. On the other hand, in order to conserve tin and steel plate, the War Production Board limited the canning of certain vegetables. It also required considerable proportions of the canned vegetable pack to be set aside for Government use. Radical changes are occurring in the production and consumption of vegetables. What further changes are in store for 1943?

Production in 1942 was at a peak largely because of favorable weather. Irish potato acreage was considerably lower than the average of the last 10 years but because of high yields, production was slightly greater than average and about 4 percent over 1941. The greatest increase was in the 10 surplus Western States. Yields and production were lower in the three Eastern surplus States. To provide for increased needs in spite of yields in 1943 that will probably be lower than the high yields of 1942, suggested acreage goals for 1943 have been set substantially over 1942. Sweetpotato production in 1942 was 5 percent over 1941 because of higher yields. There is need for greater acreage in 1943.

SUPPLIES of fresh vegetables in 1942 were fairly plentiful. But

fall supplies of snap beans, lettuce, celery, green peas and most other vegetables, with the exception of carrots, were smaller than in 1941. Suggested 1943 acreage goals for fall and winter fresh vegetables are 101 percent of 1942 acreage (excluding watermelons and cantaloupes). Greatest increases are asked for carrots, lima beans, snap beans and onions and greatest decreases for cauliflower, cucumbers, celery, eggplant, lettuce and green peppers.

Production of green peas for processing increased about 24 percent in 1942 compared with 1941 but the pack probably will fall short of the 1942 goal by about 8 percent. Greatest increases of production occurred in the Western and North Central States and in New York. Inadequate spring rainfall in Maryland and Delaware lowered production. Production of tomatoes for processing is indicated to be about 13 percent greater than 1941, the greatest increase occurring in the Mid-Southern area. Abnormal rains reduced yields in the Northeast. The canned tomato pack probably will be about 10 percent short of the goal.

CIVILIAN consumption of canned vegetables will be curtailed in 1942-43 because a large part of the pack is needed for Government use and because carry-overs into 1942 have been negligible. On the whole, the supply of tomatoes, green peas, corn, snap and lima beans, other than for Government use, will be only about 60 percent of 1941. Canned root crop and kraut supplies will be much less than in 1941. Part of the Government supplies in 1942 and 1943 will be used to feed a larger Army and Navy and there will be fewer civilian consumers. Nevertheless, more fresh and quick frozen vegetables and potatoes will be needed to substitute for the smaller civilian supplies of canned goods.

There are relatively large supplies of quick frozen vegetables for the 1942-43 season. Cold storage holdings of these vegetables on December 1 were 15 percent greater than a year earlier. The production of dehydrated vegetables, while still not of major importance, is becoming increasingly important, especially for potatoes, cabbage, corn, and carrots. Almost all dehydrated vegetables are produced for military use. They are easily stored and occupy relatively little shipping space. Requirements in 1943 will be several times as great as in 1942.

ALTHOUGH greater production will be needed in 1943, many problems may make difficult the continued production of vegetables even at the present level. As the war progresses production goods will become more scarce. Most of the crops were harvested in 1942 but largely through the utilization of school youth, the aged, and through careful planning. In 1943, labor supplies will be still more scarce than in 1942. Moreover, transportation problems will probably come to the fore as greater demands are made on the railroads to move military goods, and as motor trucks wear out. The scarcity of construction materials limits processing facilities to existing plants and lines. Finally, the high yields that were responsible for peak production in 1942 may not be repeated in 1943. The following suggestions may be of assistance in overcoming some of the difficulties that will be associated with 1943 production.

A repetition of the high yields of 1942 should not be depended on in 1943 to provide needed production. Improved growing practices, higher prices, and similar conditions may be partly responsible for an upward trend of yields but it is doubtful if these conditions account for the full measure of yields obtained in 1942. Good weather was a deciding factor. Ac-

cording to available records the odds are against a repetition in 1943 of the high yields of 1942. It is even likely that the production difficulties that will be encountered in 1943 will cause yields to be lower than average. Average yields of the last 5 or 10 years applied to prospective acreages would give a more probable determination of production than the extension of the favorable yields of more recent years.

THE possible scarcity of fertilizers makes necessary a consideration of the most productive method of utilizing available supplies. Fertilizer may be most productively utilized in areas if applied up to the point where the additional returns from additional applications are equal on all farms. Preliminary studies have shown that in most cases relatively small returns are secured in the production of Irish potatoes from nitrogen applications of over 60 pounds per acre. Thus, it has been estimated that in Maine a reduction of 10 percent in the application of nitrogen would only reduce production by 1 percent. Also, fertilizer supplies could be conserved by obtaining the greatest production increases in areas that require small applications of fertilizer. For example, green peas are produced in the Pacific Northwest with relatively small fertilization. Finally, most supplies of fertilizer should be made available for the vegetables which produce the most nutrients per unit of fertilizer application. A determination of the relative nutritive output of different vegetables per unit of fertilizer input could furnish a basis for priority actions in the allocation of fertilizer.

LABOR shortages as they affect the intensive labor needs of vegetable farmers will be a decisive factor in 1943 production. Many methods of alleviating labor shortages have already been outlined elsewhere. The

following suggestions are made primarily with reference to vegetable production:

Greater diversification by planting crops with different maturing dates would reduce peak needs for labor. Government production and purchase programs could implement diversification on the farm by diversifying requirements as much as possible.

Similarly, plantings of the same crop with different maturing dates either by choosing early and late varieties or by spreading planting dates or by planting at different elevations, as the practice is for green peas, would tend to extend the harvest and, therefore, remove some of the peak labor needs.

The under-utilized labor supply on many low-income farms could be tapped as occurred in the expansion of tomato production in the Ozark area.

Other things being equal, crops could be grown which produce most nutrients of a balanced nature per unit of labor input.

LIMITED processing facilities have been cited as an important obstacle to expanding the production of processed vegetables. However, in many cases plants are only being partly utilized. At the peak of the season many are utilized only for a period of from 10 to 12 hours per day. Equipment is only partly utilized before and after the peak of the harvest and is not utilized during the night. If increased production is needed, it may be desirable to utilize to full capacity the existing plants, rather than to construct new plants or lines and thereby divert materials needed for military purposes. More intensive use of existing plants may be achieved in the following ways:

(1) By lengthening the working day. It may be difficult to obtain workers who are willing to work at night but payment of higher wage rates for such night work would be a step in over-

coming this difficulty. Such action might be cheaper in the long run than building new plants or lines that would not be needed after the war.

(2) By shifting contracted production from plants that are operating at a peak and have surplus supplies to nearby plants that are operating at less than capacity.

(3) By further diversifying the present purchase and production program on canned vegetables. The production of a greater variety of vegetables and products would make possible a more intensive use of equipment. Moreover, the differences of maturing dates for the different crops would permit canning operations at near peak levels throughout the canning season.

MANY processing crops are usually graded by a representative of the processor. This leads in some cases to strained relationships with the farmer and the reluctance of some farmers to grow processing crops. Improved grading practices under Federal supervision might facilitate production increases by improving farmer-processor relationships. More field supervision by processors might also be helpful.

A COMPARISON between the nutritive value and transportation requirements of the different vegetables would be useful in the allocation of transportation facilities should they become short. Much inedible material is usually shipped with many crops. For example, about 55 percent of fresh green peas are pods which are discarded by consumers although the pods must be transported. This situation may be remedied for some crops by discarding some of the waste before shipping. For example, carrots may be transported without tops. The encouragement of more localized and home production might also be desirable to economize on long-haul shipments.

With the growing scarcity of re-

sources, greater production of those crops which contain the most nutrients, and reduced production of other crops is urgent. Such action appears to be the logical consequence of a war economy. However, all of

the input and output relationships associated with labor, fertilizer, transportation, and other factors, need to be considered before such action is taken.

WILLIAM KLING.

Recent Transportation Developments

FARMERS are being asked to produce a record volume of food and fiber in 1943. In the face of manpower shortages and other obstacles, that will be a major task. An equally important and difficult task will be the transportation of these products to the places at home and abroad where they will be most needed, and the movement of necessary supplies to the farms.

The war has greatly increased the volume of passengers and goods to be moved at precisely the time when two important branches of the transportation system are being drastically curtailed, *viz.*, motor carriers and coastwise and intercoastal shipping.

Because of the shortages of rubber and in some regions gasoline, the lack of new trucks and passenger vehicles, and the dwindling supply of replacement parts, motor transportation is playing a much reduced role as compared with its important place in the period before Pearl Harbor. The trucking of fresh fruits and vegetables to the 12 principal cities was 12 percent less in volume in 1942 than in 1941.¹

The manpower problem is acute in the for-hire trucking industry, as reported by the United States Employment Service. The principal shortages are in drivers, mechanics, rate clerks, and unskilled labor. The

industry is meeting the problem partially by a gradual increase in the employment of women in the office jobs formerly held by men. It is thought that more women might be used as drivers of light trucks and as mechanics. Plans have been discussed for drawing men from the less essential transportation services and placing them in "war-essential" transportation jobs.

Even more drastic has been the reduction of coastwise and intercoastal shipping. Intercoastal service has been completely eliminated and of late very few ships have operated along the Gulf and Atlantic seaboard. Coastwise shipping is not likely to recover until the submarine menace is eliminated or at least reduced substantially from its present level of intensity and more ships are made available. Intercoastal shipping will not return to the old trade routes until the war is over.

The United States normally imports large quantities of sugar, coffee, tea, and tropical fruits. These imports require the use of a substantial volume of seagoing shipping. The problem of ocean shipping has become serious, partly because of the expanded demand for space to carry lend-lease goods to our Allies, partly because of the huge task of transporting and supplying our growing armed forces abroad, and partly because merchant ship losses through enemy action exceeded new construction until recently. Cargo ships are now being built faster than they are being sunk, but the United Nations still have

¹ However, the large trucking concerns have been hauling a record volume of traffic. The American Trucking Associations, Inc., reports that 201 commercial truckers operating in 41 States carried 12.8 percent more freight in October 1942 than in October 1941. The A. T. A. index of traffic, computed on the basis of 100 for the average monthly tonnage of the reporting truckers during the three-year period 1938-40, was 186 for October 1942.

fewer ships than they need. It has been necessary, therefore, to restrict the importation of some foods and other products and to use the scarce shipping space for more pressing lend-lease and military needs.

OUR railroad system is the largest in the world. But extensive as it is, the rail network could not assume the added burden of motor, inter-coastal and coastwise traffic. The motor carriers especially must be kept in operation for essential service.

The vital question is whether the railroads can do the job ahead with such aid as they can get from the motor carriers and other agencies of transportation. The answer depends upon the answers to several collateral questions. One of the most important of these is: How much traffic will have to be diverted from the other agencies to the rails? And the question of diversion in turn revolves around policies affecting tire production and rationing, gasoline rationing, allocation of steel and other strategic materials to construct and maintain equipment, and the supply of labor. Another vital question is the extent to which facilities are to be used efficiently, *i. e.*, better loading, more direct routing, etc. And, of course, the question of adequacy is influenced by the volume and character of the total traffic the Nation will produce.

AT this moment, the greatest or at least most developed threat to rail operations is to be found in the rapidly worsening manpower situation. Particularly serious are the shortages in the supply of maintenance of way and shop labor. Director Joseph B. Eastman of the Office of Defense Transportation predicted in December that the railroads would have to find 168,000 new workers by July 1, 1943, to meet the war needs of the country. The chief sources of this supply will have to be women, older men, and men now employed in the

so-called less essential occupations. While the use of the older workers involves a loss in efficiency, it is preferable to bear with inefficiency rather than do completely without some services. The necessity of finding large numbers of new employees for transportation enterprises in the months immediately ahead focuses attention on the importance of intensive and systematic training programs. Many of these new employees will be common or unskilled labor drawn from the bottom of the labor market. The most competent among them should be properly graded and promoted to positions for which they are fitted.

Also of concern is the tight locomotive and car situation. There is considerable difference of opinion within Government circles as to the proper amount of steel and other necessary materials which should be allocated to new construction and maintenance of cars and locomotives. During 1942 the railroads were required by the War Production Board to get along on far less new equipment and materials than they had requested. As a result there has been very little expansion of rail facilities since 1941, and there will be very little expansion in 1943 unless present allocations are increased.

THE Government has taken steps during the past year to restrict the use of the transportation system to the more essential tasks and to employ existing facilities, which are not likely to be expanded, as efficiently as possible. The tempo of control increased rapidly towards the end of 1942. In the motor field, the Office of Defense Transportation has issued general orders providing for: (1) The elimination of circuitry and the general conservation of equipment of common carriers; (2) a reduction of 25 percent in the mileage of vehicles operated in local delivery service; (3) the establishment of joint information offices to reduce empty mileage; (4) a 25-percent

cut in the mileage of contract and private carriers; (5) a mileage rationing program for trucks to be enforced by use of Certificates of War Necessity as a condition for continued operation (the effective date of this order has been postponed until January 31); and (6) a maximum speed limit of 35 miles per hour.

The orders as a whole, with the cooperative support of the trucking industry, have undoubtedly had considerable effect. Strict attention is being devoted to maintaining equipment in good condition. Trucking companies are loading vehicles heavily and reducing excess miles materially. Director Eastman estimates that truck mileage in 1942 was about 25 percent below the 1941 level. He hopes that the ODT orders will lead to still further reductions in truck mileage, stating that the cut must reach 40 percent "if all the trucks are to roll throughout the period of the gap in rubber supply." If this result is not achieved, or if the synthetic rubber production should not develop according to schedule, a system of priorities in the distribution of truck tires probably could not be avoided.

Gasoline and tire rationing have led to drastic reductions in the operation of private carriers in the eastern States. The inauguration of Nationwide gasoline rationing on December 1 is having a similar effect elsewhere and the periodic inspection of tires will promote better and longer use of equipment.

THE ODT has assured farmers that their truck transportation needs will be looked after. In a statement issued on December 1, farmers, stock raisers, and dairymen were told, "No farmer is to be put out of business as a result of the Office of Defense Transportation's Certificate of War Necessity plan. As long as the tires, spare parts, and gasoline are available, the ODT will help every farmer to get enough tires, spare parts, and gasoline

to carry on his necessary truck operations."

The statement announced an appeals procedure to correct any inadequacies in mileage and gasoline rations. Any farmer who was dissatisfied with the mileage and gasoline allowed in the Certificate of War Necessity was invited to take up the matter with his County Farm Transportation Committee. If the committee was convinced that the farmer was entitled to additional mileage, it was directed to make a suitable recommendation on behalf of the farmer to the ODT district office.

All ODT district offices were instructed by Washington to accept the recommendations of the County Farm Transportation Committees, unless they contained obvious errors. The local War Price and Rationing Board of the Office of Price Administration was to grant the farmer a gasoline ration in the amount provided for in the certificate as issued by the ODT district office. During the time the appeal is being carried on, the local War Price and Rationing Board is to grant the farmer a gasoline ration on his own statement of need, good until January 31.

Through misunderstanding, some farmers did not make application for their certificates by December 1, the original deadline for filing set by the ODT. These farmers had to go to their local War Price and Rationing Boards for gasoline. In some instances the rations obtained in this manner were not sufficient for their needs. In such event the farmers were permitted to make appeals in the usual manner through their County Farm Transportation Committees.

A farmer operating a passenger car and trailer is not required to obtain a Certificate of War Necessity. He is eligible, however, for a supplemental gasoline ration and should go to his County Farm Transportation Committee for assistance when he needs additional gasoline.

IN the rail field, ODT has issued a number of orders to improve efficiency. One of these is the requirement that refrigerator cars should be used only for products actually requiring protective service. The chief items of traffic barred from refrigerator car service as a result of this order are canned goods, beverages, and cheese. ODT has also required heavier loading of cars carrying less-than-carload merchandise. The railroads are also generally prohibited from accepting for shipment (with certain exceptions) freight cars not loaded to their rated capacity or their maximum practicable cubical content. The purpose is to conserve motive power and equipment. The effective date of the order, originally set for September 15, was postponed until November 1. The main argument

advanced against the order was the alleged danger of excessive damage to the freight. However, it is possible by the use of modern containers and methods to load cars heavily and safely.

If these measures, taken as a whole, do not effectively solve the transportation problem, the country will have to resort to more direct control of the movement of traffic. Territories may be zoned with a view of eliminating excessively long hauls of certain commodities; cross-hauling may be forbidden; eventually goods may move on priorities or permits. Powers with regard to domestic shipping priorities on commodities are vested in the War Production Board. Thus far these controls over traffic have not been invoked, but the signs are clear that change is imminent.

RALPH L. DEWEY.

Principles of Price Supports

THE Department of Agriculture has announced its policy will be to generally support prices for dairy and poultry products, meat animals, and for those food crops which are most essential for domestic consumption and foreign shipment at a level sufficient to assure producers of attractive returns for the desired production. This general policy will be carried out through specific loan, purchase, or other programs which will be announced as needed.

It is obligated by law to make available to cooperators under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, loans at 90 percent of parity on cotton, rice, tobacco, and peanuts and at not less than 85 percent of parity on corn (in the commercial area) and on wheat. The specific loan rates will be determined as of the 15th of the month preceding beginning of the marketing year.

The Department is also obligated, within the limits of funds available, to support at 90 percent of parity, prices of those commodities for which the

Secretary of Agriculture requests expanded production. These commodities up to the present include hogs, eggs, chickens (excluding broilers or chickens weighing less than three pounds live weight), turkeys, butter, cheese, dry skim milk, evaporated milk, specified varieties of dry peas and dry edible beans, soybeans for oil, flaxseed for oil, American-Egyptian cotton, and potatoes. Minimum price supports in terms of dollars-and-cents have also been announced for many of these commodities—and in many instances these are well above 90 percent of current parity prices. These are discussed in the commodity reviews.

PRICES of many commodities are at or close to ceiling levels as a result of exceptionally strong demand for almost all agricultural commodities—a demand which will continue to increase in 1943. For the same reason, prices of many commodities naturally will be above the announced support levels during the year ahead.

Economic Trends Affecting Agriculture

Year and month	Industrial production (1935-39=100) ¹	Income of industrial workers (1935-39=100) ²	Cost of living (1935-39=100) ³	1910-14=100					Prices paid, interest, and taxes	Farm wage rates
				Wholesale prices of all commodities ⁴	Prices paid by farmers for commodities used in—					
					Living	Production	Living and production			
1925.....	90	126	125	151	163	147	156	170	176	
1926.....	96	131	126	146	162	146	155	168	179	
1927.....	95	128	124	139	160	144	153	166	179	
1928.....	99	127	123	141	160	148	155	168	179	
1929.....	110	134	122	139	159	147	154	167	180	
1930.....	91	110	119	126	150	141	146	160	167	
1931.....	75	85	109	107	128	123	128	140	130	
1932.....	58	59	98	95	108	109	108	122	96	
1933.....	69	61	92	96	108	108	108	118	85	
1934.....	75	76	96	109	122	123	122	128	95	
1935.....	87	87	98	117	124	127	125	130	103	
1936.....	103	100	99	118	123	125	124	128	111	
1937.....	113	117	103	126	128	136	131	134	126	
1938.....	89	91	101	115	122	125	123	127	125	
1939.....	108	105	99	113	120	122	121	125	123	
1940.....	123	119	100	115	121	124	122	126	126	
1941.....	156	⁵ 166	105	127	131	131	131	134	154	
1941—December.....	168	⁵ 192	110	137	143	141	142	143	166	
1942—January.....	172	⁵ 193	112	140	146	145	146	146	166	
February.....	172	⁵ 201	113	141	147	147	147	147	167	
March.....	172	⁵ 203	114	142	150	149	150	150	177	
April.....	174	⁵ 212	115	144	152	149	151	151	177	
May.....	175	⁵ 219	116	144	153	150	152	152	183	
June.....	176	⁵ 226	116	144	154	150	152	152	202	
July.....	179	⁵ 240	117	144	154	150	152	152	202	
August.....	183	⁵ 244	118	145	155	150	153	152	220	
September.....	185	⁵ 247	118	145	157	151	154	153	220	
October.....	188	⁵ 250	119	146	158	151	155	154	220	
November.....	⁵ 192	263	120	146	159	151	156	155	220	
December.....	⁶ 194				159	153	156	155	220	

Year and month	Index of prices received by farmers (August 1909-July 1941=100)								Ratio, prices received to prices paid, interest, and taxes
	Grains	Cotton and cotton-seed	Fruits	Truck crops	Meat animals	Dairy products	Chickens and eggs	All groups	
1925.....	157	177	172	153	141	153	163	156	92
1926.....	131	122	138	143	147	152	159	145	86
1927.....	128	128	144	121	149	155	144	139	84
1928.....	130	152	176	159	151	158	153	149	89
1929.....	120	144	141	149	156	157	162	146	87
1930.....	100	102	162	140	134	137	129	126	79
1931.....	63	63	98	117	92	108	100	87	62
1932.....	44	47	82	102	63	83	82	65	53
1933.....	62	64	74	105	60	82	75	70	59
1934.....	93	99	100	103	68	95	89	90	70
1935.....	103	101	91	125	117	108	117	108	83
1936.....	108	100	100	111	119	119	115	114	89
1937.....	126	95	122	123	132	124	111	121	90
1938.....	74	70	73	101	114	109	108	95	75
1939.....	72	73	77	105	110	104	94	92	74
1940.....	85	81	79	114	108	113	96	98	78
1941.....	96	113	92	144	144	131	122	122	91
1941—December.....	112	138	98	162	157	148	153	143	100
1942—January.....	119	143	102	204	164	148	147	149	102
February.....	121	150	98	161	173	147	135	145	99
March.....	122	151	111	136	180	144	130	146	97
April.....	120	158	118	158	190	142	131	150	99
May.....	120	159	131	152	189	143	134	152	100
June.....	116	153	148	169	191	141	137	151	99
July.....	115	155	131	200	193	144	145	154	101
August.....	115	151	126	256	200	151	156	163	107
September.....	119	156	129	191	195	156	166	163	107
October.....	117	158	134	226	200	165	173	169	110
November.....	117	160	127	238	197	171	178	169	109
December.....	124	162	151	293	195	175	183	178	115

¹ Federal Reserve Board, adjusted for seasonal variation. Revised September 1941.

² Total income, adjusted for seasonal variation. Revised November 1941. ³ Bureau of Labor Statistics.

⁴ Bureau of Labor Statistics index with 1926=100, divided by its 1910-14 average of 63.5. ⁵ Revised.

⁶ Preliminary.

NOTE.—The index numbers of industrial production and of industrial workers' income shown above are not comparable in several respects. The production index includes only mining and manufacturing, the income index also includes transportation. The production index is based on volume only, whereas the income index is affected by wage rates as well as by time worked. There is usually a time lag between changes in volume of production and workers' income, since output can be increased or decreased to some extent without much change in the number of workers.